

-57-

13-49
Tudeh
Party:
Article of
Communism
in Iran,"
July 18

The strategic importance of Iran was clearly recognized, and the "Review" pointed again and again to the extremely delicate and tricky balance of US-Iranian relations. Since it could make no recommendations, however, the "Review" was content to note the varying intensity of Soviet pressure on the Iranians and to put the United States constantly on notice that no Persian government could ever be trusted.

The situation at the end of 1949 was at least partially summed up in an incidental paragraph in CIA 12-49:

"Soviet drives toward expansion of Soviet influence in the Near East have been contained at least temporarily on the northern Greek-Turkish-Iranian frontier line. The USSR is trying simultaneously to break down this defense line and to disrupt the unstable political and economic structures behind it. The development of an effective Near Eastern regional association to strengthen the defense-in-depth of this area in the foreseeable future is extremely unlikely. 1

D. THE ANALYSIS OF THE FAR EAST

ONE-15
amentation
Soviet
Objectives
China,"
ber 15,
1947

As early as September, 1947, the "Review" saw little hope for Nationalist China, and most of the "Review's" analysis of the Far East is based on this estimate. Unless the Nationalists could somehow restore the situation, China would have to be considered virtually beyond United States control. It would not be possible to deal amicably with a Communist China, nor would it be practicable for the United States to attempt a solution through force. In the words of the "Review": "The proximity of Eastern Siberia to the present perimeter of Soviet and Chinese Communist control in Korea, Manchuria, and North China, the remoteness of the United States, and the weakness of the Chinese National Government, would render any US attempt at containment by directly opposing force to force a most unequal contest."

ONE-1,
ber 26,
1947